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INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the Federal Circuit again championed the First Amendment 
and the freedom of trademark owners to register marks that the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had previously deemed unfit to 
print.  The court fully embraced the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
affirmation of its 2015 In re Tam1 decision,2 which had declared the 
Lanham Act’s ban on disparaging marks under section 2(a) to be a First 
Amendment violation.3  In December, the Federal Circuit’s In re Brunetti 
4 decision struck a second blow to section 2(a) by deeming its ban on 
“immoral” or “scandalous” marks unconstitutional.5  The Federal Circuit 
also issued ten other trademark decisions6 in 2017,7  which, as with prior 
years, represented less than three percent of its total docket.8  However, 
as discussed below, these decisions—which range from holding that the 
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act is the same 
                                               
 1. 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 2. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 3. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335. 
 4. 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 5. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1356. 
 6. This Article uses the term “trademark decisions” to refer primarily to decisions 
that substantively address claims under the Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141n.  Practitioners should be aware that this Article is a survey only of the 
2017 trademark decisions issued by the Federal Circuit that substantively address 
trademark issues and that other opinions issued by the Federal Circuit in 2017 may also 
impact trademark law practice but are not considered or discussed herein.  For a 
summary of 2016 trademark decisions, see Anita B. Polott & Rachel E. Fertig, 2016 
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1411 (2018). 
 7. In re Latindo, 712 F. App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); In re 
I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, 
Inc., 864 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Lyons, DVM v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary Sports 
Med. & Rehab., 859 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 366 (2017); 
Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (per curiam); Milo & Gabby LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 335 (2017); In re DDMB, Inc., 681 F. App’x 919 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017); In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 8. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, BY CATEGORY:  FY 2017 
(2018), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/FY_17_Filings 
_by_Category.pdf. 
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as that under the Patent Act9 to articulating a three-factor test to 
determine ownership of a mark10—are likely to significantly impact the 
practice of trademark law for years to come. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
The court issued eleven decisions addressing substantive trademark 
issues in 2017, including one—Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. 
(Romag II )11—that was a reinstatement from a 2016 decision.  Each of 
these decisions is summarized below. 
A.  Prohibition of Immoral or Scandalous Matter:  In re Brunetti 
In In re Brunetti, the Federal Circuit held that the provision of 
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of a trademark 
that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous 
matter” was an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of speech.12 
The appellant, Erik Brunetti, owned a clothing brand called FUCT.13  
In 2011, the USPTO refused registration of Mr. Brunetti’s application 
under section 2(a), contending that the mark was scandalous because it was 
a variation of the word “fucked.”14  Mr. Brunetti requested reconsideration 
and filed an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or 
“the Board”).15  The Board affirmed the original examiner’s decision to 
reject the mark for vulgarity and denied Mr. Brunetti’s request for 
reconsideration, noting that the FUCT mark was the phonetic equivalent 
of the vulgar word “fucked.”16 
Mr. Brunetti appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit, 
advancing three arguments:  (1) there was not substantial evidence to 
support the Board’s finding that the mark was vulgar; (2) even if the court 
found the mark to be vulgar, section 2(a) only prohibited immoral or 
                                               
 9. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag II ), 686 F. App’x 889, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 10. Lyons, 859 F.3d at 1029. 
 11. 686 F. App’x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1357. 
 13. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337. 
 14. Id.  The USPTO rejects a mark when it finds that a “‘substantial composite of the 
general public’ would find the mark scandalous.”  Id. at 1336.  If a mark is vulgar it is 
scandalous.  Id.  The USPTO defines vulgar as “lacking in taste, indelicate, [and] morally 
crude.”  Id. (alteration in original).  Examining attorneys take “the context of the 
marketplace as applied to only the goods described in the application” and 
“contemporary attitudes” into account when deciding whether a mark is scandalous.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 1337. 
 16. Id. 
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scandalous marks, not vulgar marks; and (3) section 2(a)’s prohibition of 
“immoral or scandalous marks” was unconstitutional.17  The Federal 
Circuit disposed of Mr. Brunetti’s first argument, determining that there 
existed substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that a 
“‘substantial composite’ of the American public” would determine that 
the trademark FUCT was vulgar.18  The court also rejected Mr. 
Brunetti’s second argument, holding that the USPTO can prove that a 
mark is scandalous by showing that it is vulgar.19 
The court focused on Mr. Brunetti’s third argument:  in light of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Matal v. Tam20—which held 
unconstitutional the section 2(a) provision that barred registration of 
disparaging marks—the prohibition on registering immoral or 
scandalous marks also violated the First Amendment.21  Analyzing 
section 2(a) as a possible content-based restriction, the court began by 
noting that such restrictions prohibit speech discussing a particular 
topic or conveying a particular message.22  Content-based restrictions 
are unconstitutional unless they survive strict scrutiny review, meaning 
that the government must prove the restriction is narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling government interest.23 
The government conceded that section 2(a)’s ban on immoral or 
scandalous material was a content-based restriction.24  Moreover, the 
government did not argue that section 2(a) survived strict scrutiny 
review.25  Rather, the government argued that the First Amendment did 
not apply in the context of trademark registrations because it was “a 
government subsidy program or limited public forum.”26  Alternatively, 
the government argued that trademarks were purely commercial speech, 
implicating the less exacting intermediate level of scrutiny.27 
The court ultimately rejected the government’s argument that 
trademark registration is a government subsidy28 because it found that 
trademark registration does not implicate Congress’s power to spend 
                                               
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1339. 
 19. Id. 
 20. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
 21. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1340. 
 22. Id. at 1341–42 (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)). 
 23. Id. at 1342. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1344. 
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funds, which is a prerequisite for a government subsidy program.29  
Further, the court found that trademark registration is not a limited 
public forum because unlike limited public forums that have been 
recognized in the past, trademark registration is not tethered to 
government property.30  As for the government’s alternative theory that 
trademark registration is commercial speech subject to only intermediate 
scrutiny, the court noted that while trademarks include elements of 
commercial speech, they also often have expressive content and therefore 
cannot be characterized as purely commercial speech.31 
Because the government’s attempts to recast section 2(a)’s 
prohibition of immoral or scandalous matter failed, the constitutionality 
of this provision was assessed under strict scrutiny review and did not 
survive that rigorous standard.32  In dicta, the court noted that the 
prohibition would not have even survived a less rigorous intermediate 
scrutiny analysis.33  Thus, the court held that section 2(a)’s ban on 
immoral or scandalous marks was an unconstitutional content-based 
restriction.34  The Federal Circuit’s decision was not appealed by the 
government, making Brunetti a final decision. 
B. Willfulness Requirement to Recover Infringer’s Profits:  Romag 
Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. ( Romag II) 
On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Romag 
Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag I )35 and simultaneously vacated the 
Federal Circuit’s decision.36  The Court remanded the case to the 
Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in SCA 
Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC.37 
In a per curiam order on May 3, 2017, the Federal Circuit in Romag II 
reinstated the section of its Romag I decision holding that the Second 
Circuit’s willfulness requirement for claiming a trademark infringer’s profits 
                                               
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1347–48. 
 31. Id. at 1348–49. 
 32. Id. at 1349. 
 33. Id. at 1355. 
 34. Id. at 1357. 
 35. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., (Romag I) 817 F.3d 782 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1373 (2017). 
 36. Romag Fasteners, Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1373. 
 37. 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017) (holding that laches cannot be used as a defense against 
patent infringement claims brought within the statutory period); Romag Fasteners, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. at 1373. 
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remains good law.38  The Federal Circuit reasoned that such reinstatement 
was proper given the Supreme Court’s direction to reconsider the Romag I 
decision in light of SCA Hygiene, which “was solely concerned with the 
defense of laches against a claim for patent infringement damages” and 
therefore had no effect on the relevant trademark aspects of the Romag I 
decision.39  The Federal Circuit’s reinstatement of the trademark aspects of 
Romag I has not been further appealed. 
C. Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act:  Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. 
Fossil, Inc. ( Romag III) 
In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag III ),40 the Federal Circuit 
vacated and remanded the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees 
under the Lanham Act, holding that the Lanham Act has the same 
standard for recovering attorneys’ fees as the Patent Act.41 
After the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment from the district 
court that Fossil had engaged in patent and trademark infringement in 
Romag II,42 Romag sought attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act, Lanham 
Act, and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).43  
However, the district court only granted fees under the Patent Act and 
CUTPA, determining that the Lanham Act had a more stringent 
standard for awarding attorneys’ fees that was not met.44 
With respect to the Patent Act, the district court applied the more 
lenient Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.45 standard in 
analyzing whether a case is “exceptional,” allowing for the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees.46  In Octane, the Supreme Court held that an exceptional 
case under the Patent Act is one that, given the totality of the 
                                               
 38. Romag I, 817 F.3d at 785, 789. 
 39. Romag II, 686 F. App’x 889, 890 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  On August 9, 2017, the 
Federal Circuit issued its revised opinion on the patent issue involved in Romag I in 
light the SCA Hygiene decision.  Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc. (Romag III), 866 
F.3d 1330, 1333 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 40. 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 41. Id. at 1333, 1336.  The Federal Circuit also addressed whether the district court 
erred in awarding fees under the Patent Act and whether the district court erred in 
ruling that Romag’s 50(a) motion precluded a finding that Fossil’s noninfringement 
position was frivolous.  Id. at 1336, 1341.  Those issues are beyond the scope of this 
Article and will not be discussed. 
 42. Romag II, 686 F. App’x at 890. 
 43. Romag III, 866 F.3d at 1333. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 46. Romag III, 866 F.3d at 1334. 
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circumstances, is distinct from others in the considerable strength of a 
party’s litigating position or the unreasonable way in which the case was 
litigated.47  Applying that standard, the district court found that Romag 
was entitled to attorneys’ fees under section 285 of the Patent Act because 
Fossil did not withdraw defenses it had made until after trial and because 
it considered Fossil’s invalidity defense to be close to frivolous.48 
With respect to the Lanham Act, the district court applied the more 
stringent standard from the Second Circuit regarding the Lanham Act’s 
fee-shifting provision, which only allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees 
“on evidence of fraud or bad faith.”49  Because the district court did not 
find bad faith, fraud, or willfulness on the part of the defendants, it 
determined that the case was not exceptional within the meaning of the 
Lanham Act.50  Fossil appealed the award of fees under the Patent Act 
and Romag cross-appealed the denial of fees under the Lanham Act.51 
The Federal Circuit in this case reviewed the district court’s grant of 
attorneys’ fees for abuse of discretion.52  In addressing Romag’s 
contention that the district court erred in not awarding attorneys’ fees 
under the Lanham Act, the Federal Circuit considered whether the 
Octane standard should apply to the award of fees under the Lanham 
Act.  It concluded that it should, based on the identical language in both 
Acts for attorneys’ fees and the legislative history of the Lanham Act’s 
fee-shifting provision.53  In addition, the court noted that although the 
Second Circuit had not adopted the Octane standard for Lanham Act 
cases, many other circuits had.54 
As a result, the case was remanded to the district court to consider 
                                               
 47. Id. at 1333 (citing Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756). 
 48. Id. at 1334 (finding that Fossil’s non-infringement position was not frivolous 
enough to justify an award of fees, but nevertheless concluding that Romag was 
entitled to attorney’s fees under the Patent Act because: (1) Fossil failed to withdraw 
its defenses with prejudice during the trial; (2) Fossil made an invalidity defense that 
bordered on frivolous; and (3) Romag was already penalized enough for its conduct). 
 49. Id. (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 111 (2d 
Cir. 2012)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1334–35. 
 54. Id.  The court noted that since Octane was handed down, the Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had all held that the Octane court sent a “clear message” 
that the term “exceptional” was defined for the fee provision in both the Patent Act 
and the Lanham Act.  Id. at 1335 (citing several circuit court decisions to emphasize 
that no circuit has declined to apply the Octane standard to the Lanham Act after 
specifically considering the case). 
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Lanham Act and the Patent Act attorneys’ fees and to evaluate whether 
an award of fees is appropriate given the correct analysis under Octane.55 
D. Distinctiveness 
1. Genericness:  In re Magnesita Refractories Co. 
Among the substantive trademark decisions issued by the Federal 
Circuit in 2017 was an analysis of genericness in In re Magnesita 
Refractories Co.56  In that case, the court affirmed the TTAB’s refusal to 
register the mark MAGNESITA because the term (and its English 
equivalents “magnesia” and “magnesite”) identified key components in 
refractory products.  The Federal Circuit found that substantial evidence 
supported the TTAB’s determination that the term was generic as 
applied to refractory products in Class 19 and highly descriptive as to 
online information services for refractory products in Class 37.57 
In November 2009, Magnesita Refractories Co. (“MRC”) first filed an 
application for the mark MAGNESITA based on its bona fide intention to 
use the mark in commerce under section 1(b) of the Lanham Act.58  The 
examining attorney applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents, under 
which an examiner may consider whether the English equivalent to the 
mark would be generic or descriptive.  An examiner may apply this 
doctrine when the mark is comprised of a foreign word from a language 
familiar to an appreciable segment of American consumers.59  The 
examining attorney found that “magnesia” and “magnesite”—translations 
of MAGNESITA—were components of refractory products and thus were 
merely descriptive of MRC’s goods and services.60  Following the refusal, 
MRC attempted to amend the application to claim acquired 
distinctiveness under section 2(f) based on five years of substantially 
exclusive and continuous use of the mark in commerce.61  The examining 
                                               
 55. Id. at 1341–42.  Similar to the Lanham Act attorney fees’ claim, the court found 
that the district court erred in declining to consider Romag’s earlier litigation 
misconduct when awarding attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act.  Id. at 1340. 
 56. No. 2016-2345, 2017 WL 5664747 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 2017). 
 57. Id. at *2–3. 
 58. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., Nos. 77873477, 85834316, 2016 WL 10571037, 
at *1 (T.T.A.B. May 17, 2016) (explaining that MRC sought to register the word 
MAGNESITA as a standard character mark by filing Application Serial No. 77,873,477 
with the Patent and Trademark Office), aff’d, 2017 WL 5664747. 
 59. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at *2–3. 
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attorney rejected this amendment.62  The examining attorney also 
rejected a subsequent amendment to register the Class 19 goods on the 
supplemental register on the basis that the mark was generic; however, 
she accepted the amendment for MRC’s goods in Class 37, concluding 
that the mark was merely descriptive for those services.63 
In January 2013, MRC filed another application seeking to register 
the mark MAGNESITA in Classes 19 and 37 with an asserted first use 
in October 2008 and a claim, supported by evidence of advertising and 
sales, that the mark had acquired distinctiveness.64  The examining 
attorney found the mark to be generic or highly descriptive for the 
refractory products in Class 19 for the same reasons set forth in the 
refusal of the initial application, and the attorney found the mark to 
be highly descriptive for the services claimed in Class 37.65  The 
examining attorney denied the application in both classes, finding that 
the evidence of use that MRC had provided, including three-and-a-half 
years of gross sales numbers and an article about MRC’s acquisition of 
a U.S. refractory products company, was not sufficient to show that 
MAGNESITA distinctively indicated MRC as the source for the applied-
for refractory products and services.66 
MRC appealed both denials to the Board, which consolidated the 
claims and affirmed the examiner’s opinion that MAGNESITA was 
generic for the goods claimed in Class 19 and that MRC had failed to 
show acquired distinctiveness for both the Class 19 goods and Class 37 
services claimed in the second application.67  The Board held that 
because the mark was highly descriptive with respect to the Class 37 
services, more evidence was necessary to confirm acquired 
distinctiveness.68 
MRC appealed the Board’s decision to the Federal Circuit.69  The 
Federal Circuit first disposed of MRC’s argument that after B & B 
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.,70 the court should reconsider the 
                                               
 62. Id. at *2. 
 63. Id. 
 64. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2016 WL 10571037, at *2 (explaining that MRC 
filed Application Serial No. 85,834,316 with the Patent and Trademark Office as a use-
based application under section 1(a) of the Trademark Act). 
 65. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *2. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at *2–3. 
 68. Id. at *3. 
 69. Id. 
 70. 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (holding that the party opposing registration bears the 
burden of proof). 
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burden of proof on the applicant to show acquired distinctiveness.71  
The court rejected that argument, explaining that “B & B Hardware does 
not address the evidentiary burdens involved in ex parte proceedings.”72  
The court then affirmed that the evidence showing that magnesite and 
magnesia were key components in refractory products was sufficient to 
support the determination that the mark MAGNESITA was generic with 
respect to the goods in Class 19.73 
The Federal Circuit then considered the application for MAGNESITA 
in Class 37, which asserted acquired distinctiveness.74  The court 
acknowledged that the Lanham Act specifically provides the Board 
discretion regarding whether to find acquired distinctiveness based 
solely on five years of substantially exclusive and continuous use of a 
mark in commerce.75  The court highlighted the statutory language 
providing that the Board “may” accept that evidence as prima facie 
evidence of distinctiveness.76  The court further explained that the 
descriptiveness of MAGNESITA’s Class 37 services created “an elevated 
burden to show acquired distinctiveness,” which MRC did not meet.77 
2. Descriptiveness:  In re Driven Innovations, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit’s In re Driven Innovations, Inc.78 decision addressed 
whether the mark DOTBLOG was descriptive of a service that located and 
summarized blog posts related to a user’s search inquiry.79  The court 
reversed the Board’s determination that the mark was descriptive with 
respect to those services, finding instead that it was merely suggestive.80 
In December 2006, Driven Innovations, Inc. (“Driven”) filed an “intent 
to use” application for the mark DOTBLOG.81  In August 2007, the 
USPTO approved the application and issued a notice of allowance.82  On 
October 5, 2012, a new examining attorney reviewed a statement of use 
filed by Driven that year and refused registration.83  The refusal was based 
                                               
 71. In re Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 WL 5664747, at *3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at *4. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at *5. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 79. Id. at 996. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 996–97. 
 83. Id. at 997. 
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on a finding that DOTBLOG was descriptive of the services claimed 
because “the applicant [was] providing specific information to customers 
with respect to information and key terms on blogs.”84 
Driven responded that the refusal was procedurally improper 
because an earlier examining attorney approved the mark and the new 
examining attorney misapplied the clear error standard.85  Driven 
further argued that the refusal was incorrect on the merits because the 
mark was suggestive.86  The examining attorney issued a second Office 
Action on April 25, 2013, maintaining the refusals, and Driven 
responded by repeating its arguments, only to receive a final refusal.87 
On appeal, the TTAB found that DOTBLOG was descriptive because 
“each component [of the mark had] retained its character as merely 
descriptive or without trademark significance in relation to the 
services, and . . . the composite term does not present a new meaning 
that is not itself merely descriptive.”88  The TTAB also noted that 
consumers would “immediately understand” DOTBLOG to describe “a 
website that may feature information for blogs, or be related to blogs, 
regardless of the domain in which the blogs reside.”89  It also found 
that the mark was descriptive because of a forthcoming .blog generic 
top-level domain, reasoning that “consumers would perceive the mark 
as conveying the impression of ‘providing specific information’ from 
searches of sites on the ‘.blog’ domain.”90 
The Federal Circuit disagreed and noted that descriptiveness is not 
analyzed in the abstract but rather “in relation to the particular goods 
for which registration is sought.”91  Analyzing the mark in this manner, 
the court found that “the definitions of ‘dot’ and ‘blog’ d[id] not 
                                               
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1261, 1267 (T.T.A.B. 2015), 
rev’d, 674 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 89. Id.  The Board concluded that the examining attorney’s reliance on sections 1, 
2, 3, and 45 to refuse registration was in error, but considered these arguments as 
further support for refusal under section 2(e)(1).  Id. at 1268.  Driven acknowledged 
at oral argument before the Federal Circuit that it would not pursue a formal 
procedural challenge of these findings.  In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x at 
997. 
 90. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1268 (explaining that when 
combining the activation of the .blog with DOTBLOG’s services, users would understand 
that the mark provides information from searching websites on the .blog domain). 
 91. In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 674 F. App’x at 998 (citation omitted). 
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provide sufficient support for the Board’s finding under a substantial 
evidence standard” because neither dot nor blog would “immediately 
convey” or “immediately describe” the online nature of Driven’s 
services or the relationship of its services to blogs.92  The court further 
noted that the Board’s reasoning was problematic because it would 
result in a refusal to register any marks where the claimed goods or 
services had any relation to blogs.93 
3. Descriptiveness:  In re North Carolina Lottery 
In In re North Carolina Lottery,94 the Federal Circuit agreed with the TTAB’s 
determination that the mark FIRST TUESDAY is merely descriptive;95 thus, 
the TTAB’s refusal to register the mark was warranted.96 
North Carolina Lottery (“N.C. Lottery”) is a state agency that has 
operated traditional lottery drawing games and instant lottery scratch-
off games in North Carolina since 2006.97  To maintain customer 
interest in its games, N.C. Lottery introduced new scratch-off games on 
the first Tuesday of each month.98  It also claimed to use the mark 
FIRST TUESDAY continuously on its print materials, website, and 
point-of-sale displays since July 2013.99 
On October 1, 2014, N.C. Lottery applied to register the FIRST 
TUESDAY mark for “lottery cards,” “scratch cards for playing lottery 
games,” and “lottery services.”100 In support of its registration, N.C. 
Lottery submitted promotional materials along with explanatory text 
detailing new scratch-offs available each month.101 
The examining attorney denied the application because he 
determined that the promotional materials merely described an aspect 
of N.C. Lottery’s goods and services—that on the first Tuesday of each 
month the new scratch-offs would be available.102 
The TTAB affirmed the examiner’s refusal, reasoning that the 
promotional materials made it clear that new scratch-off games would 
                                               
 92. Id. at 999. 
 93. Id. at 1000. 
 94. 866 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 95. Id. at 1368. 
 96. Id. at 1369. 
 97. Id. at 1365. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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be offered every first Tuesday of the month.103  The materials therefore 
required no mental leap or multi-step reasoning process to reach a 
conclusion as to the nature of the goods and services involved.104 
N.C. Lottery appealed, arguing that the TTAB erred as a matter of law 
by relying on the explanatory text of the specimens to supplement the 
meaning of the mark itself.105  N.C. Lottery believed the TTAB should 
have instead limited the inquiry to what a general consumer would know 
about N.C. Lottery’s goods and services and would immediately 
understand the mark to mean without additional context.106 
The Federal Circuit analyzed N.C. Lottery’s claim in two parts.  It 
first discussed whether the Board erred in considering the explanatory 
text when analyzing descriptiveness.  The second part of the analysis 
discussed whether there was substantial evidence to support the 
Board’s conclusion that the mark was descriptive. 
In the first instance, N.C. Lottery argued that explanatory text in its 
specimens could not supply additional meaning to a mark because the 
mark itself did not convey that meaning; therefore, the Board should 
have considered the mark without the explanatory text.107  However, the 
court agreed with the USPTO’s position that the Board was required to 
consider the mark in its commercial context in order to determine the 
public’s perception.  It refused to cut the explanatory text from the 
promotional materials when assessing commercial context.108 
The court did not go so far as to say that the use of explanatory text 
with a mark automatically renders the mark merely descriptive.  
Instead it explained that a mark’s distinctiveness in the context of 
explanatory text is a case-specific analysis.109  However, the court found 
that the Board in this case was correct in considering the explanatory 
text of the specimens to assess descriptiveness of the mark. 
N.C. Lottery next argued that because it needed to explain the 
connection between the mark and goods and services offered, the 
explanatory text was evidence that the mark was not descriptive.110  It 
                                               
 103. In re N.C. Lottery, No. 86411401, 2016 WL 4140920, at *3 (T.T.A.B. 2016), 
aff’d, 866 F.3d 1363. 
 104. Id. 
 105. In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1367. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1368. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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cited two cases, Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer 111 and Swatch AG v. Beehive 
Wholesale, LLC,112 as examples in which courts have relied on explanatory 
text to find a mark was not descriptive.113  The Federal Circuit 
distinguished the two cases on the grounds that connecting the 
TUMBLEBUS and SWAP marks to their services and products required 
a greater mental leap than connecting FIRST TUESDAY to when new 
scratch-offs are being offered.114  In other words, there was less of a 
mental leap between understanding that FIRST TUESDAY refers to a 
new good or service being offered on the first Tuesday of a new month 
than what was required in Tumblebus and Swatch. 
In agreeing with the USPTO that substantial evidence supported the 
Board’s finding of mere descriptiveness, the court concluded that the 
mark FIRST TUESDAY did not identify the source of goods or services 
as much as it described a feature or characteristic of those goods or 
services.115  The commercial context in this case demonstrated that “a 
consumer would immediately understand the intended meaning of 
FIRST TUESDAY” because the explanatory text accompanying the 
mark was straightforward and simple.116 
4. Disclaimer Requirement:  In re DDMB, Inc. 
In In re DDMB, Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
decision requiring an applicant to disclaim all words in the applied-for 
mark—EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and its accompanying design—or 
face rejection of its application on the basis that the mark was merely 
descriptive of the applicant’s services.118 
DDMB, Inc. applied to register the mark119 in connection with 
“providing video and amusement arcade services” in Class 41 and “bar 
services [and] bar services featuring snacks” in Class 43.120  The 
examining attorney refused registration on the ground that the terms 
EMPORIUM and ARCADE BAR were merely descriptive and therefore 
must be disclaimed.121  DDMB agreed to disclaim ARCADE BAR but 
                                               
 111. 399 F.3d 754 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 112. 739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 113. In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d at 1368. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1369. 
 116. Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. 681 F. App’x 919 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 118. Id. at 923. 
 119. See infra Figure 1. 
 120. In re DDMB, 681 F. App’x at 920. 
 121. Id. 
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not EMPORIUM.122  The examining attorney issued a final refusal, and 
DDMB appealed the decision to the Board, which affirmed.123 
Figure 1:  DDMB, Inc. Proposed Mark 
 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s determination 
that EMPORIUM was merely descriptive of DDMB’s services and 
concluded that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.124  
The court asserted three reasons for its decision: (1) dictionary evidence 
indicated that the word “emporium” encompassed a variety of 
commercial activities, including those listed in the application; 
(2) additional dictionary evidence featured as an example of the word’s 
usage in the phrase “pizza emporium” contradicted DDMB’s argument 
that goods and services purchased in an emporium were not to be 
consumed on site; and (3) third-party registrations of marks disclaimed 
the term “emporium” for restaurant, catering, and bar services.125 
The court also agreed that substantial evidence negated DDMB’s 
argument that EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR was a unitary mark such 
that EMPORIUM was arbitrary as used.126  In reaching this conclusion, 
the court approved the Board’s rejection of DDMB’s argument that it 
created an “incongruous redundancy” when it placed EMPORIUM in 
front of ARCADE BAR because the two terms had similar meanings.127  
Here, the court agreed with the Board’s reasoning that EMPORIUM 
did not overlap with BAR because the words are not synonyms.128  
                                               
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 921–22. 
 125. Id. at 922. 
 126. See id. (viewing the inseparability of the terms in “EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR” 
as substantial evidence supporting the mark’s unitary nature). 
 127. See id. (specifying that, since the terms “emporium” and “bar” are not 
synonymous, they do not overlap to the point of rendering the use of “emporium” 
arbitrary). 
 128. Id. 
1370 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1355 
 
Similarly, the EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR was not a unitary mark 
because the mark as a whole did not take on an independent meaning 
separate from its constituent parts, as DDMB contended.129 
Finally, although not addressed by the Board, the court noted that 
DDMB undermined its position that EMPORIUM did not describe its 
services by agreeing to disclaim ARCADE BAR as descriptive and then 
arguing that EMPORIUM was redundant of that term.130  Accordingly, 
the court affirmed the Board’s decision.131  DDMB subsequently agreed 
to disclaim EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and the mark was registered. 
5. Primarily Merely a Surname:  Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc. 
In Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc.,132 the Federal Circuit vacated 
and remanded the Board’s decision that the mark EARNHARDT 
COLLECTION was not primarily merely a surname.133  The Federal 
Circuit found that the Board’s opinion was unclear as to whether 
COLLECTION was merely descriptive in the context of the applicant’s 
goods and services.134 
The appellee, Kerry Earnhardt, is the son of the late Dale Earnhardt, a 
famous race car driver.  Kerry is also the stepson of the appellant, Theresa 
Earnhardt, Dale’s widow.135  Kerry Earnhardt’s company, Kerry Earnhardt, 
Inc. (“KEI”), used the mark EARNHARDT COLLECTION as a lifestyle 
brand and licensed that mark for use in connection with construction 
services.136  Theresa Earnhardt owned several trademark registrations for 
and the associated common law rights in trademarks containing DALE 
EARNHARDT in connection with various goods and services.137 
KEI filed a trademark application for the EARNHARDT 
COLLECTION mark for use in connection with furniture in Class 20 and 
custom construction of homes in Class 37.138  Theresa Earnhardt opposed 
the application, arguing that consumers were likely to confuse the 
applied-for mark with her registered marks.139  She also asserted that the 
                                               
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 923. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 864 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 133. Id. at 1376. 
 134. See id. at 1380 (finding it unclear whether the Board employed a 
descriptiveness or genericness inquiry in evaluating the term COLLECTION). 
 135. Id. at 1376. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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applied-for mark ran afoul of section 2(e)(4) of the Lanham Act because 
EARNHARDT COLLECTION was primarily merely a surname and 
therefore not registrable without proof of acquired distinctiveness.140  The 
Board dismissed the opposition, concluding that Theresa Earnhardt had 
not established a likelihood of confusion between her marks and the 
applied-for mark.141  Moreover, the Board determined that the mark was 
not primarily merely a surname because the addition of the term 
COLLECTION diminished the surname significance of EARNHARDT 
and COLLECTION was not the “common descriptive or generic name 
for KEI’s goods and services.”142  Theresa Earnhardt appealed to the 
Federal Circuit on the surname issue.143 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit began by noting that “[a] mark is 
primarily merely a surname” if, from the general public’s perspective, 
the significance of the mark emanates primarily from the surname.144  
Because both parties admitted that EARNHARDT was a surname, the 
issue turned on where the term COLLECTION fell on the 
distinctiveness scale with respect to KEI’s goods and services.145  If the 
term was suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful, then the primary 
significance of the mark as a whole would not be that of a surname.146  
If, on the other hand, the term was generic or descriptive, the overall 
impression of EARNHARDT COLLECTION would be of a surname.147 
Theresa Earnhardt contended that, while the Board had clearly 
concluded that the term COLLECTION was not generic, it did not 
address whether that term was merely descriptive of KEI’s goods.148  
The Federal Circuit agreed that the Board’s opinion was unclear as to 
whether it conducted the proper inquiry into whether the 
COLLECTION element was merely descriptive.149  As a result, the 
court vacated and remanded the case to the Board with instructions to 
clarify its analysis regarding whether the term was merely descriptive 
                                               
 140. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2012) (providing that a mark is not 
registrable if it is “primarily merely a surname”). 
 141. Earnhardt, 864 F.3d at 1377. 
 142. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (citing In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 145. Id. at 1377, 1380. 
 146. See id. at 1377–78 (identifying distinctiveness of the second term in a mark to 
be instructive as to whether the first term is a surname). 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 1379. 
 149. Id. at 1380. 
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of furniture and custom home construction.150 
6. Trade Dress:  Industrial Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc. 
In Industrial Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc.,151 the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of trade dress because 
the non-movant, SNF, Inc., failed to carry its burden.152  Specifically, the 
court concluded that SNF, Inc., was unable to show that the alleged 
trade dress was non-functional and was likely to be confused with the 
allegedly infringing product.153  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the 
award of attorneys’ fees to the movant, Industrial Models.154 
Industrial Models entered the market for fiberglass utility bodies for use 
in trucks.155  SNF, Inc., and other entities—collectively “the SNF 
entities”156—sued Industrial Models, alleging, inter alia, that Industrial 
Models’s fiberglass utility bodies infringed their trade dress.157  When the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted Industrial 
Models’s motion for summary judgment for declaratory judgment of non-
infringement of trade dress, the SNF entities appealed.158 
The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Industrial Models.159  Under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1), an individual who uses “any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device” that is likely to be confused with another’s established trade 
dress, with respect “to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 
goods,” shall be subject to liability.160  The court noted that the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to grant trade dress rights 
to unregistered trademarks in product design if the product is shown 
to be distinctive and non-functional and likely to cause confusion with 
the product for which protection is sought.161  The party asserting trade 
                                               
 150. Id. at 1381. 
 151. Nos. 2017-1172, 2017-1173, 2017 WL 5152159 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 2017). 
 152. Id. at *8. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *2.  The Federal Circuit also addressed antitrust claims brought against 
the SNF entities by Industrial Models and Industrial Models’s Motion for Attorneys’ 
Fees relating to the SNF entities’ claims for patent and copyright infringement.  Id. at 
*3–6.  Those issues are beyond the scope of this Summary and will not be discussed. 
 158. Id. at *7. 
 159. Id. at *3. 
 160. Id. at *7 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012)). 
 161. Id. 
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dress infringement bears the burden of proving that the matter sought 
to be protected is distinctive and non-functional.162 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment because the SNF entities failed to present any evidence that 
the claimed trade dress was non-functional and instead relied on bare 
assertions that the claimed features were aesthetic.163  Although the lack 
of non-functionality evidence alone was sufficient for the court to affirm 
the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit noted an additional 
ground to support the district court’s decision:  the SNF entities 
conceded they provided no evidence of likelihood of confusion between 
the claimed trade dress and the allegedly infringing products.164 
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the district court abused 
its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees to Industrial Models.165  The 
court noted that the proper standard for evaluating if the case was 
exceptional—and therefore whether attorneys’ fees were appropriate—
under trade dress law was the same standard used for patent cases:  
whether the case stands out by virtue of the strength of a party’s position 
or whether the case was litigated unreasonably.166  Under the framework, 
the Federal Circuit agreed that an award of attorneys’ fees was appropriate 
because the SNF entities provided only bare assertions of non-
functionality and presented no evidence of likelihood of confusion.167 
7. Likelihood of Confusion:  In re Latindo 
In In re Latindo,168 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision 
to deny registration of the mark SENSI after conducting a likelihood 
of confusion analysis.169  The court held, overall, that the new mark was 
                                               
 162. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (“In a civil action for trade dress 
infringement . . . , the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of 
proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.”)). 
 163. See id. (citing Indus. Models, Inc. v. SNF, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-689-A, 2016 WL 
4533321, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2016), aff’d, No. 2017-1172, 2017 WL 5152159 (Fed. 
Cir. Nov. 7, 2017)) (finding persuasive the District Court’s determination that the SNF 
entities failed to identify more than “‘the overall shape, profile, and appearance’ of 
the utility bodies”). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at *8. 
 166. Id. at *7 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1749, 1756 (2014)).  For further discussion on the implications of deeming a case 
exceptional, see supra Section I.C. 
 167. Indus. Models, Inc., 2017 WL 5152159, at *8. 
 168. No. 2017-1292, 2017 WL 5256285 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2017) (per curiam). 
 169. Id. at *3. 
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confusingly similar to SENSI-CARE, an older mark.170 
P.T. Arista Latindo (“Arista”) filed a trademark application based on 
an intent to use SENSI with goods in several classes, including 
Class 5.171  The examining attorney refused to register the mark in 
relation to the Class 5 goods under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act 
“because of [its] likelihood of consumer confusion . . . with two 
previously registered marks.”172  The marks at issue owned by Convatec 
are as follows:  (1) SENSI-CARE in standard characters for “medicated 
skin care preparations, namely, protectants for the prevention of skin 
irritation and preparations for the treatment and prevention of diaper 
rash,”173 and (2) the stylized version174 for “[s]kin protectant 
preparations, namely, medicated skin care preparations; preparations 
for protecting the skin from irritation, namely, pharmaceutical skin 
lotions; preparations for treatment and prevention of diaper rash, 
namely, medicated diaper rash ointments and lotions.”175 
Figure 2:  Arista Proposed Mark 
 
Arista appealed to the TTAB, arguing that (1) “the marks were 
dissimilar”; (2) “the goods were unrelated”; and (3) “there were no 
actual instances of consumer confusion.”176  In response to Arista’s 
arguments, the Board assessed the relevant confusion factor introduced 
in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.177 and determined that the goods—
diapers and diaper rash cream—were related and sold through similar 
channels and that the classes of customers were similar to both Arista 
and Convatec.178  Analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the Board 
                                               
 170. Id. at *1, *3. 
 171. See id. at *1 (identifying Arista’s Class 5 goods as “adult and baby diapers and 
diaper inserts” and pointing out that a trademark application based on the intent-to-
use for a mark is filed under section 1(b) of the Lanham Act). 
 172. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012)). 
 173. See id. (identifying the mark under Registration No. 2,618,533). 
 174. See infra Figure 2. 
 175. See In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *1 (alteration in original) (identifying 
the mark under Registration No. 3,640,455). 
 176. Id.  The TTAB only addressed Arista’s first two claims.  The actual confusion 
analysis, if any, was not presented in this case, and the Board did not reach any decision 
based on that argument. 
 177. 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 178. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *1 (citing In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
476 F.2d at 1361 (specifying a non-exhaustive list of thirteen factors, which are known 
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determined that the marks were similar and “that there was a high 
likelihood of confusion with the previously registered marks” to affirm 
the rejection of Arista’s mark.179 
On appeal, Arista did not dispute the similarity in sound and meaning, 
the close relation of the goods, or “that the channels of trade and classes 
of customers [were] similar.”180  Rather, Arista argued that there was a 
different connotation and commercial impression regarding the mark 
because consumers, when considering SENSI in the context of the 
website, would assume the mark meant sensible versus Convatec’s use of 
the mark to refer to sensitive.181  In the end, Arista claimed the Board erred 
in refusing to consider the extrinsic evidence of Arista’s tagline.182 
In rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit held that only the 
evidence “in the application and cited registration, not extrinsic evidence, . . . 
determines likelihood of confusion.”183  In other words, the Board must 
only compare the mark found in a prior registration with the mark in the 
application at issue.  Accordingly, an applicant cannot rely on how a mark 
is displayed in commerce “to prove that the commercial impressions are 
different” because trade dress is easily changed.184 
Arista’s attempt to use Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC 185 
to support its utilization of extrinsic evidence in assessing likelihood of 
confusion was thwarted by the Federal Circuit, which found that Arista 
misread Coach.186  In particular, the court and the Board in Coach 
considered differences in the goods and services in the application and 
registration as opposed to extrinsic evidence when concluding that the 
trademarks had different commercial impressions.187 
As a last attempt, Arista argued that dictionary.com showed SENSI 
                                               
as the “DuPont factors,” that are considered in light of evidence in the record to 
evaluate likelihood of confusion)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (emphasis added). 
 184. Id. (citing Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 727 (C.C.P.A. 
1968)). 
 185. 668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 186. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *3.  The court in Coach found no likelihood 
of confusion, even though the marks were identical, because the uses were inherently 
different—one mark was for educational materials and the other was for a fashion 
label.  See Coach, 668 F.3d at 1360–61, 1371. 
 187. In re Latindo, 2017 WL 5256285, at *3. 
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would be understood as sensible.188  However, the court found that 
dictionary evidence was not helpful to Arista because dictionary.com 
did not actually define SENSI, and noted only that sensible was 
alphabetically nearby.189 
Because there was nothing in Arista’s application indicating 
“‘SENSI’ should be understood to mean ‘sensible’” and because Arista’s 
slogan did not appear in the application, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the TTAB’s refusal to grant registration.190  The court found that 
Arista’s application did not prove that the identical terms used by 
Arista and Convatec had different definitions or made different 
commercial impressions.191 
8. Ownership:  Lyons v. American College of Veterinary Sports 
Medicine & Rehabilitation 
In Lyons v. American College of Veterinary Sports Medicine & 
Rehabilitation,192 the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to 
cancel an individual’s registration on the Supplemental Register.193  
Despite the fact that the appellant was the first to use and register the 
mark at issue, the court found that the mark was actually owned by her 
former colleagues based on a three-factor indicia of ownership test.194 
In 1999, the appellant, Sheila Lyons, started an organizing committee with 
the goal of forming an accredited veterinary specialist organization for 
treating animals.195  Upon Ms. Lyons’s suggestion, the committee used the 
mark THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF VETERINARY SPORTS MEDICINE 
AND REHABILITATION (“VETERINARY SPORTS”).196  In 2004, Ms. 
Lyons was dismissed from the committee.197  Years later, the committee was 
accredited by the American Veterinary Medical Association.198 
In May of 2005, approximately one year after Ms. Lyons was dismissed 
from the committee, she applied to register VETERINARY SPORTS in 
connection with veterinary education services and eventually obtained a 
                                               
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 859 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 366 (2017). 
 193. Id. at 1027, 1029, 1032. 
 194. See id. at 1029. 
 195. See id. at 1024. 
 196. See id. at 1024–25. 
 197. Id. at 1025. 
 198. Id. 
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registration for the mark on the Supplemental Register.199  Just shy of 
the five-year anniversary of the registration date, the committee, which 
was still using VETERINARY SPORTS, petitioned to cancel Ms. Lyons’s 
registration on the grounds of priority of use and likelihood of 
confusion, misrepresentation of source, and fraud.200  Despite it not 
being one of the grounds put forth by the committee, the Board 
concluded that Ms. Lyons did not own the mark and found her 
registration void ab initio.201  Ms. Lyons appealed to the Federal Circuit, 
arguing that she had “continuously” used VETERINARY SPORTS since 
1996, long before the committee began using it.202 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s legal 
conclusions de novo.203  The court adopted the Board’s three-factor 
test to determine ownership: “(1) the parties’ objective intentions or 
expectations; (2) who the public associates with the mark; and (3) to 
whom the public looks to stand behind the quality of goods or services 
offered under the mark.”204 
Using this three-factor framework, the court reviewed the Board’s 
factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.205  First, the 
court affirmed the Board’s determination that the parties objectively 
manifested the collective intent that the entire team would form a 
veterinary specialist organization that would use VETERINARY 
SPORTS, not that Ms. Lyons would perform personal services under the 
mark.206  There, the court approved of the Board’s refusal to give weight 
to Ms. Lyons’s subjective intent.207  Second, the Federal Circuit agreed 
with the Board’s conclusion that the public associated VETERINARY 
SPORTS with the committee in part because Ms. Lyons only engaged in 
“de minimis” use of the mark that did not qualify as “use in commerce,” 
while the committee engaged in substantial use of the mark.208  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that the relevant public 
                                               
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  “The cancellation proceeding was suspended for almost three years” 
because Ms. Lyons sued the American College of Veterinary Sports Medicine and 
Rehabilitation for infringing her mark.  Id. (citing Lyons v. Am. Coll. of Veterinary 
Sports Med. & Rehab., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 92, 98 (D. Mass. 2014)). 
 201. Id. at 1025–26. 
 202. Id. at 1028–29. 
 203. Id. at 1027. 
 204. Id. at 1029. 
 205. Id. at 1027, 1029. 
 206. Id. at 1030. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1030–31. 
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looked to the committee, not Ms. Lyons, to stand behind the quality of 
the educational and certification services associated with the mark 
because the committee, not Ms. Lyons, had achieved accreditation from 
the American Veterinary Medical Association.209 
Thus, despite the fact that Ms. Lyons used the mark first, introduced 
it to the committee, and registered it, the committee was the true owner 
of VETERINARY SPORTS.210  As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the Board’s decision to cancel Ms. Lyons’s trademark registration.211 
CONCLUSION 
Without question, the Federal Circuit’s 2017 decisions significantly 
clarify the interpretation and implementation of the Lanham Act.  But 
in the wake of the Federal Circuit’s In re Brunetti decision, it remains to 
be seen whether the feared “smut-bath”212 of applications sullies the 
marketplace or empowers bold expression.  As the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged, “[f]or immoral or scandalous marks, [the] message is 
often uncouth.  But [such marks] can espouse a powerful cause.”213  
Nonetheless, given the essence of trademarks as trusted identifiers in 
a marketplace of options, the enduring wisdom of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes seem to support the Federal Circuit’s further freeing 
of expression for trademarks this year: 
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and . . . we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe . . . , unless they so imminently threaten . . . 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check 
is required to save the country.214 
                                               
 209. Id. at 1031–32. 
 210. Id. at 1032. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Hugh Hansen, Symposium:  Most Important Free Speech Case in Many Years, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 22 2017, 11:52 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/ 
symposium-important-free-speech-case-many-years. 
 213. In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (discussing examples of 
vulgarity used in the service of powerful causes, including FUCK HEROIN, Application 
No. 86,361,326; FUCK CANCER, Application No. 86,290,011; FUCK RACISM, 
Application No. 85,608,559). 
 214. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(stating further that “truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be 
carried out.  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution[, which] . . . is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment . . . [and] we should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be 
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To be sure, as Justice Holmes acknowledged, trusting in the power of 
the truth is an experiment, but “the theory of our Constitution . . . is 
[also] an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”215  We look forward 
to seeing how the results unfold. 
 
 
                                               
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to 
save the country”). 
 215. Id. at 630. 
